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ESSAY
A NATURAL LAW MANIFESTO OR AN APPEAL
FROM THE OLD JURISPRUDENCE
TO THE NEW
Hadley Arkes*
On june 4th, a gathering was held under the auspices of the Claremont Institute
to announce the formation of a new Center for Natural Law. The purpose of the new
Center is to hold seminars for students in law school, or newly sprung from law school,
as well as practicing lawyers and judges, who wish to get clear again on the way that
natural law forms the ground of our law and comes into play every day in the practical
business of deciding cases. A new seminar, the James Wilson seminars, will bring
together judges and lawyers, along with professors of philosophy and law in exploring
the teaching and practice of natural law. Professor Hadley Arkes of Amherst College
was named as the Director of the new Center, and offered these remarks in launching
the project. In marking out the mission of the Center he sought to make the case anew
for natural law, in terms that would challenge both the liberal and conservative jurists
who have been most adamant in resisting the claims of natural law to be applied
seriously in our jurisprudence.
We are here today to announce a new Center, in Washington and
the country, a Center launched in Washington by the Claremont Insti-
tute, a Center for the jurisprudence of natural law. And in making
the announcement we want to proclaim again the case for natural law,
and offer a kind of Natural Law Manifesto. We announce here noth-
@ 2012 Hadley Arkes. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Edward Ney Professor of Jurisprudence and American Institutions at Amherst
College, Director of the Claremont Institute's Center for the jurisprudence of Natural
Law (Washington, D.C.). Professor Arkes would like to offer a special thanks to the
members of the Law Review for the research they did in filling out even further some
of the sources in the notes. It was a gift quite unexpected by him, and he is sure that
it has the effect of presenting him as a scholar more formidable than he is.
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ing new to the world, much in the way thatJames Wilson, at the origin
of the Constitution, proclaimed that we were not, under this Constitu-
tion, inventing new rights. The object of the Constitution, he said, was
"to acquire a new security for the possession or the recovery of those
rights" we already possess by nature.' The great Blackstone had
famously said that, on entering civil society, we give up those unquali-
fied rights we had in the State of Nature, including the liberty of
"doing mischief."2 To which James Wilson asked, in a Talmudic ques-
tion, "Is it a part of natural liberty to do mischief to any one?"3 In
other words, as Lincoln and Aquinas had it, we never had a "right to
do a wrong."4 Even in the State of Nature we did not have a right to
murder or rape, and therefore as we entered civil society, the laws that
barred people from murdering and raping, never barred them from
anything they ever had a rightful liberty to do. And so, what rights did
we give up on entering civil society? The answer given by Wilson and
Alexander Hamilton was: none. As Hamilton said in The Federalist No.
84, "Here . .. the people surrender nothing ... ." Hence there was
something not quite right in a the notion of a Bill of Rights reserving
to people rights they had not surrendered to the State, for that
implied that they had indeed surrendered the body of their rights to
the State and that they were holding back now a few they hadn't sur-
rendered.6 The very purpose of the Constitution-the purpose that
1 James Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 585, 585 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). The fuller passage runs in this
way:
What was the primary and the principal object in the institution of govern-
ment? Was it. . . to acquire new rights by a human establishment? Or was it,
by a human establishment, to acquire a new security for the possession or
the recovery of those rights, to the enjoyment or acquisition of which we
were previously entitled by the immediate gift, or by the unerring law, of our
all-wise and all-beneficent Creator?
2 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125-26 ("[T]he law, which restrains a
man from doing mischief to his fellow-citizens, though it diminishes the natural,
increases the civil liberty of mankind . . .
3 Wilson, supra note 1, at 587.
4 For Lincoln, see Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen Douglas, at
Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
245, 257 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); Hadley Arkes, News for the Libertarians: The Moral
Tradition Already Contains the Libertarian Premises, 29 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'v 61, 63
(2005).
5 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 578 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed.,
1961).
6 For the fuller account of the original argument over the Bill of Rights, running
to the root, see HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION 58-80 (1990).
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directed all branches of the government, not merely the courts-was
the securing of those "natural rights."7
One could deny that point, as Hamilton said, only by slipping
into the teaching of Hobbes and supposing that there were no rights
before the advent of a government, no morality antecedent to civil
society. As Hamilton pointed out, in Hobbes's view morality was all
conventional.8 We could not expect anyone to accept any moral
restraints on his conduct, for until there were laws, he could have no
assurance that there were moral truths out there that anyone would
respect.9
Hamilton may be taken as a telling voice here, for indeed the
American Founding would not make any sense unless those doctrines
of Hobbes were decisively rejected. But that is to say, again, that the
Founding, and the second Constitution it brought forth, found its
telos, its central purpose, in the securing of natural rights. That under-
standing of the regime could not be explained without the recogni-
tion of moral truths, of standards of moral judgment that had to be in
place before we could even conceive a Constitution. The whole pro-
ject of a constitutional government could not begin unless one under-
stood in the first place the notion of a regime of law, a government
restrained by law, of rules that bound rulers as well as those who were
ruled. One had to understand, that is, in the first place the very logic
7 See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 5, at 578-79 (Alexander Hamilton)
(quoting the preamble of the Constitution); Edward J. Erbele, The Right to Information
Self-Determination, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 965, 1008 n.240 (citing Scorr D. GERBER, To
SECURE THESE RIGHTs 193, 200 (1995)).
8 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Farmer Refuted, in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAM-
ILTON 81, 87 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961).
9 As Hobbes wrote, "[t]he desires and other passions of man are in themselves
no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those passions, till they know a law
that forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot know . . . ." See THOMAS HoB-
BES, LEVIATHAN 65 (George Routledge & Sons 1886) (1651). That is, before the exis-
tence of law and civil society, we cannot expect men to know the difference between
right and wrong, or to treat that difference as one they can afford to respect.
Hamilton's rejoinder came in that remarkable pamphlet he wrote when still a
student at King's College (later Columbia):
[T]he reason [Hobbes] run into this absurd and impious doctrine, was, that
he disbelieved the existence of an intelligent superintending principle, who
is the governor, and will be the final judge of the universe. . . . Good and
wise men, in all ages, have embraced a very dissimilar theory. They have
supposed, that the deity, from the relations, we stand in, to himself and to
each other, has constituted an eternal and immutable law, which is, indis-
pensibly, obligatory upon all mankind, prior to any human institution
whatever.
HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 87.
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of "law"-of propositions that could rightly claim to be valid for every-
one, not merely expressions of the private interests of those who
ruled. But that brought us back instantly to the N-word: nature. As
Aristotle taught at the beginning, the defining mark of the polis was
the presence of law, and law sprang from the nature of only one kind
of creature.10 Only one kind of being could understand and respect a
law beyond his own appetites, or grasp what it meant to bear an obli-
gation to a contract or a law even when it no longer accorded with his
interests or inclinations. It must have been the same creature referred
to by Kant when he said that all of the moral principles governing our
lives may be drawn from the very idea of a "rational being as such."'"
The American Founders understood that there was nothing dis-
tinctly American then about the idea of a rule of law, or the principles
that barred ex post facto laws, or established the wrongness of bills of
attainder. 12 They understood that these principles would not be
brought into being by the Constitution they were framing. Those princi-
ples had to be in place as we were guided in the framing of a legal
structure. The Founders knew they could draw then on what Black-
stone called the "laws of Nature and reason."13 In that vein, Jefferson
famously remarked that everything was changeable in human affairs,
except the unalienable rights of mankind. Those were not subject to
change, because they were rooted in something enduring either in
the nature of man or in the principles of right themselves.
But it seems to be widely forgotten that the tradition of natural
law always made a place for positive law, the law that is "posited" or
enacted in any place, and sensitive then to conditions distinctly local.
We see signs on the road saying 35 mph or 70 mph, and those num-
bers have no moral significance. But Kant reminded us that behind
the positive law is a deeper natural law that tells us why we would be
justified in having a law in the first place.14 We can grasp the princi-
ple that would justify us in restraining the freedom of people to drive
in a manner that puts innocent life at hazard. But we translate that
10 See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1252a-1253a.
11 As Kant remarked, the very idea of law, or a moral principle, is present only in
a rational being. And "[s]ince moral laws have to hold for every rational being as
such, we ought rather to derive our principles from the general concept of a rational
being as such . . . ." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
79 (H.J. Paton trans., 1964).
12 See, e.g., ARKEs, supra note 6, at 61.
13 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *58 n.7.
14 "Among external laws, those to which an obligation can be recognized a priori
by reason without external legislation are natural laws, whereas those that would
neither obligate nor be laws without actual external legislation are called positive
laws." IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 18 (John Ladd trans., 1999).
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principle into a regulation that could apply the principle to the circum-
stances and terrain before us- 7 0 mph on the open highway, perhaps
35 mph on this winding country road.
I. THE RECOIL FROM NATURAL LAw
But we meet now at a time, when lawyers and judges on the con-
servative as well as the liberal side, have rather clearly rejected natural
law, treated it with derision and contempt, as though they could give a
coherent account of the law without an account of the underlying
moral principles that alone could justify the making of laws on any
subject. Judges on the conservative side retreat to some safe formula
of positive law, a focus on the text of the Constitution, or a commit-
ment to "originalism" and tradition.' 5 But with that move they trans-
mute the question; they turn jurisprudence into legislative history. They
do it because they think it is the most prudent way of protecting the
country from the adventures of judges soaring off, inventing new
rights, all on the side of the Left, all untethered to any text or to any
ground of moral judgment. But in that path there has been no safety,
and therefore no prudence, and beyond that, no coherence-no
jurisprudence that can give a coherent account of itself. As for the
liberal side in our politics, the judges show an incurable penchant for
overriding the positive laws, the laws enacted by people who are
elected to make them-laws that may protect nascent human beings
in their mothers' wombs,16 or laws that confine marriage to the com-
mitment of a man and a woman. 7 The liberal judges will offer high
sentiment, overriding the laws made by majorities in the name of a
higher law or principle.18 They make some of the sounds of those
who did natural law, but with one striking omission: they emphatically
deny that there are moral truths, truths that hold their truth even
when they run counter to the will of a majority. Professor Tribe will
simply invoke convictions "powerfully held."19 Professor Dworkin will
regard instead, as the ultimate foundation of jurisprudence, "a
nation's political traditions and culture."20 Both arguments could
readily have encompassed the rightness of slavery. For that institution
15 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REv. 849, 862
(1989).
16 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
18 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.").
19 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 8 (1985).
20 RONALD DWORIGN, LAW's EMPIRE 378 (1986).
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certainly reflected convictions "powerfully held" and a long-standing
feature in the "political traditions and culture" of this country. The
only way to evade that conclusion was to appeal to the Founders and
Lincoln in recognizing the ground in natural law that told us why we
may not rightly rule human beings in the way that humans must rule
horses and cows. 2 1 But some commentators on the liberal side would
rather live with that result than appeal to natural law and put in place
the recognition of moral truths, truths that may be used to cast judg-
ments on others, including themselves, and especially in their private,
sexual lives.
The liberal side in our politics finds its aversion to natural law in
the recognition both of moral truths and of "nature." The orthodox-
ies of postmodernism and relativism on the American campuses
emphatically deny that there is a fixed human nature. "Natural
rights" they regard as an ideology of patriarchalism that covered the
rule of white males.22 And "nature," they say, is "socially constructed"
from one place to another according to the vagaries of the local cul-
ture.23 On the conservative side, there seems to have been a critical
21 See, e.g., Lincoln, supra note 4, at 257.
22 There are few pieces that make this argument as sharply as it has been made by
Judith Butler. See Judith Butler, Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of
"Postmodernism ", in FEMINISTs THEORIZE THE POLITICAL (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott
eds., 1992). Butler's denial that there is a fixed human nature bears even, and most
notably, on the question of whether there really are in nature "women," those beings
who have suffered injustices in many places, and whose protection and vindication
would seem to be the object of a "feminist" movement. How could the advancement
of women form a cause if there are no "women" out there? Butler puts the matter in
this way:
Within feminism, it seems as if there is some political necessity to speak as
and for women, and I would not contest that necessity ... . So we agree that
demonstrations and legislative efforts and radical movements need to make
claims in the name of women .... But this necessity needs to be reconciled with
another. The minute that the category of women is invoked as describing the
constituency for which feminism speaks, an internal debate invariably begins
over what the descriptive content of that term will be. There are those who
claim that there is an ontological specificity to women as childbearers that
forms the basis of a specific legal and political interest in representation, and
then there are others who understand maternity to be a social relation that
is, under current social circumstances, the specific and cross-cultural situa-
tion of women.
Id. at 15 (second emphasis added). The writer raises the query as to whether there is
an "ontological specificity to women," as beings truly existing then in nature. And she
shows her dexterity the rest of the way by subtly stepping around that central
question.
23 See Hadley Arkes, The Liberal Dance with Incoherence, CATH. THING (Mar. 1,
2010), http://www.thecatholicthing.org/content/view/2970/2/.
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forgetting that natural law found its grounds in "the laws of reason."2 4
A president of Amherst College once observed that I had a "theory" of
natural law. I remarked to him that when people say things of that
kind, they rather imply that they are standing back, wholesomely
detached, noticing the "theories" whizzing past them. And somehow
they are able to make judgments about the fragments of theories that
they regard as plausible or implausible, true or false. I said, "Take me
back to the ground on which you are making those judgments, to the
standards of judgment you are using, and you would be led back pre-
cisely to those 'laws of reason' that I take as the ground of the natural
law."
The conservatives fear that judges, licensed to invoke the natural
law, will be soaring off, as judges have done, but with no standards to
discipline or constrain their appeal to lofty sentiment. It is not merely
the liberal activists who doubt that reason has moral truths to discern.
The jural conservatives apparently do not themselves have confidence
that there is a discipline of reason that offers guidance and constraint
on judgment. And yet, they are convinced that "activist judges" have
abused the claim to invoke a higher law or natural law.2 5 But if they
can identify an abuse of natural law, that rather implies that they have
standards of judgment, accessible to them, standards by which they
can tell the difference between the claims of natural law, or the exer-
tions of moral reasoning, that are defensible or spurious, true or false.
In that case, we may ask, why would the conservatives take the antics of
the activist judges as an excuse to abandon the natural law, and the
moral ground of the law, rather than claiming the high ground for
themselves? Why not take their recoil as a moment to get the liberal
judges clear on the difference between a plausible appeal to the prin-
ciples of natural right and an appeal to a woolly, implausible version?
II. AN APPEAL FROM THE OLD JURISPRUDENCE TO THE NEW
I come then today, perhaps in the style of Edmund Burke, to
make An Appeal from the Old Jurisprudence to the New: from the old
jurisprudence, which relied on natural law as a matter of course, to a
new conservative jurisprudence that has not only been resistant to nat-
ural law, but contemptuous of it. At one level, some of the conserva-
24 See HADLEY ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS & ANCHORING TRUTHS 43-45, 61-
68 (2010); cf CATHECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1955, at 474 (2d ed. 2000)
("The natural law states the first and essential precepts which govern the moral life
.... This law is called 'natural' . . . because reason which decrees it properly belongs
to human nature . . . .").
25 See ARKEs, supra note 6, at 13-15.
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tive jurists insist that their concern is merely prudential; Justice Scalia
will say that he esteems the notion of natural law but the problem is
that there is no agreement on the content of natural law. 26 Far better,
he argues, that we simply concentrate on the text of the Constitution,
or where the text is silent, on the way in which the text was "originally
understood" by the men who framed and ratified it.27 Hence the doc-
trine of "originalism." But as I have had the occasion to explain many
times over myself, this notion of agreement or disagreement is built
upon one of those things the philosophers understand as a "self-refut-
ing proposition." For it reduces to the claim, "that the presence of
disagreement on matters of moral consequence must indicate the
absence of universal truths."28 But all I have to do is record my own
disagreement with that praposition and that should be enough, on its
own terms, to establish its falsity.29 This country was highly divided on
the matter of slavery, or on civil rights in our own time, and that
didn't seem to affect people with the sense that it was impossible,
under those conditions, to offer ajudgment on where justice really lay
in these matters.
Beyond that, we have had ample evidence by now to see the Jus-
tices fall into the most heated and polarized divisions over the mean-
ing of words and clauses in the text of the Constitution. We need look
only at the deep disagreement among the judges recently on the
meaning of the Second Amendment, on the right to bear arms, to say
nothing of the partisan passions that spring up over the meaning of
such terms as Equal Protection of the Laws, or Due Process of Law. It
should be clear that a reliance on the text of the Constitution does
not deliver us from serious arguments and deep disagreements. On
the other hand, one could point out that the first principles of natural
law are so bound up with the laws-and are often so evident to ordi-
nary people-that they inspire virtually no disagreement. Consider
for example that proposition that Thomas Reid regarded as one of
the truly "first principles" we draw from the logic of moral judgment
itself, a principle I've restated in this way: that we do not hold people
blameworthy or responsible for acts they were powerless to affect.30
26 See JAMEs B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 215
(2006).
27 Id. at 203.
28 See HADL.Ev ARKES, FIRST THINGS 6 (1986).
29 See id. at 51, 139-41.
30 THOMAS REID, EsSAYS ON THE ACTIVE POWERS OF THE HUMAN MIND 361 (M.I.T.
Press 1969) (noting that it was a "first principle" in morals that "what is done from
unavoidable necessity . . . cannot be the object either of blame or of moral
approbation").
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That principle may cover a wide variety of things, such as the insanity
defense, perhaps racial discrimination, and many other instances
where people really had no causal powers over their condition or their
acts and should not be held culpable. We may argue in different cases
as to how powerless or incapable people actually were, but no one
doubts the validity of the principle-or doubts that the principle
would hold true in all places, public and private, at any time. Wher-
ever we are, it is never tenable to hold someone responsible for a
crime committed before he was born, or a crime he was evidently inca-
pable of committing. Axioms of this kind have been so woven into
our law that we often fail to notice them any longer. But they stand as
striking evidence that the deepest principles of the law do not in fact
inspire a deep division in our country. They are understood readily by
ordinary people, and are not regarded as inscrutable even by lawyers.
It is at least curious then that distinguished conservative jurists
profess to find something hopelessly woolly about natural law, while
ordinary people as well as lawyers keep backing into its logic. A visitor
from London gets off a plane in New York, and we do not think we
have to look at his passport, or take note of his citizenship, before we
protect him from an unjustified assault in the street. But we seem to
understand that the same man may not take himself over to the City
College of New York and claim admission, or claim the same, subsi-
dized rate of tuition that the people of New York are willing to make
available to citizens of New York. The latter is a claim or right that
arises in a particular place, out of a particular association (like the
right to use the squash courts at Amherst College). But the right to be
protected against an unjustified assault is a right we would expect to
be respected in all places by governments that purport to be decent
and lawful governments. These distinctions were marked in the nine-
teenth century as differences between rights that arose from govern-
ments and rights that arise from nature.3 1 And the fact that the
distinctions seem universally recognized may be a mark of something
enduring and necessary in the logic that informs them.
A few years ago we encountered some tumultuous demonstra-
tions on immigration, with many illegal aliens and their sympathizers
carrying banners urging the conferral of citizenship even on those
who came to this country illegally (in violation of the "positive
laws").32 What the demonstrators were arguing, I take it, was the
31 See, e.g., ARKIs, supra note 28, at 134.
32 See Associated Press, Immigration Issue Draws Thousands into Streets, MSNBC.com
(Mar. 25, 2006, 11:50 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11442705/ns/politics/t/
immigration-issue-draws-thousands-streets/.
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rightfulness of conferring citizenship upon them quite apart from
what the positive law had stipulated. They themselves were not citi-
zens, but they wished to be, and they believed they had a rightful claim
to be recognized as citizens. But again we may be surprised by the
obvious: since these people are not citizens, the "rights" they are
invoking cannot spring from any rights they possess now as citizens.
They must be invoking an understanding of right and wrong that
stands quite apart from the positive law, the law that is "posited," set
down, enacted in any place. The demonstrators were evidently invok-
ing a standard of right and wrong that could be posed against the
positive laws in judging the rightness or wrongness of those laws. In
other words, they were appealing, in effect, to an understanding of
natural right or natural law. And once again, they were doing it with-
out any particular awareness that they were doing anything distinctly
philosophic or juridical.
III. How THAT FIRST GENERATION OF JURISTS DID IT
The first generation of our jurists and lawyers gave us remarkable
examples of how they made their way, strainlessly and elegantly, to the
ground of the natural law in the axioms of our reasoning. They would
trace their judgments back to first principles, to the principles that
were usually not mentioned in the text of the Constitution, because
they were the truths that had to be in place before one could even
have a constitution or a regime of law. And part of their achievement
is that they did it so effortlessly and gracefully that they hardly drew
much attention to themselves for doing it.
In a throwaway line at the end of his opinion in the landmark
case of Gibbons v. Ogden,33 John Marshall apologized to his readers for
spending so much time "to demonstrate propositions which may have
been thought axioms."34 That is, he assumed that every literate
reader out there would know that, before a demonstration or experi-
ment could be offered, certain indemonstrable points had to be in
place-indemonstrable because no demonstration could be under-
stood if these points were not grasped. These were truths that had to
be grasped, as the saying went, per se nota, as things true in themselves.
That the Founders were uncommonly clear on this matter was
revealed sufficiently by Alexander Hamilton in that preface he wrote
to The Federalist No. 31 on taxation. In the course of that paper, as I
have the occasion to remark, he reached no conclusion different from
what Bob Dole, in our own time, would have reached. But any reader
33 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
34 Id. at 221.
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looking at the text would have noticed at once some strikingly differ-
ent furnishings of mind. For Hamilton put it in this way:
In disquisitions of every kind there are certain primary truths or first
principles upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend.
These contain an internal evidence, which antecedent to all reflec-
tion or combination commands the assent of the mind .... Of this
nature are the maxims in geometry, that "The whole is greater than
its part; that things equal to the same are equal to one another; that
two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and that all right angles
are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other max-
ims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a
cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the end; that
every power ought to be commensurate with its object; that there
ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose,
which is itself incapable of limitation.3 5
What we grasp most notably per se nota, as something true in itself,
is the anchoring proposition and the touchstone of the laws of reason,
"two contradictory propositions cannot both be true."3 6 In the same
way, we grasp without much strain-and with no serious controversy-
these anchoring points in moral judgment and natural law: that the
language and logic of moral judgment apply only to the domain of
freedom, where people are free to choose one path of conduct over
another, and so we say again, in a reworking of Thomas Reid,3 7 that
we don't hold people blameworthy and responsible for acts they were
powerless to affect. And we grasp per se nota the truths that stand
behind that "proposition," as Lincoln called it, the anchoring proposi-
tion of the American republic, "all men are created equal."3 8 For we
grasp at once that, even in this age of animal liberation we do not sign
labor contracts with horses or cows; nor do we seek the informed con-
sent of our household pets before we authorize surgery upon them.
But we continue to think that creatures who can give and understand
reasons deserved to be ruled through a rendering of reasons orjustifi-
cations by a government that is compelled to elicit their consent.
That is the ground to which Lincoln and the Founders appealed,
with a public and a class of lawyers who found nothing incomprehen-
sible in what they were saying. They did, elegantly and luminously,
35 THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 193-94 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed.,
1961).
36 See ARKEs, supra note 28, at 51.
37 See REID, supra note 30, at 361 ("What is in no degree voluntary, can neither
deserve moral approbation nor blame.").
38 Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY FROM WASHINGTON TO WILSON 86 (John H. Finley ed., 1925).
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what the spokesmen for conservative jurisprudence in our own day
insist should never be done. Let me just take three examples of the
kind of reasoning I have in mind, executed without strain by Hamil-
ton and Marshall.
In The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton noted the rule that guided the
courts in dealing with statutes in conflict: the statute passed later is
presumed to have superseded the law, enacted earlier.39 The same
rule does not come into play, of course, with the Constitution, for a
constitution framed earlier would have to be given a logical prece-
dence over the statute that came later. Were that not the case, the
Constitution would lose its function, or its logic, as a restraint on the
legislative power. But these rules for the interpretation of statutes are
nowhere mentioned in the Constitution. As Hamilton remarked, they
were "not derived from any positive law, but from the nature and rea-
son of the thing."40
In that landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland41 Chief Justice
Marshall pointed out that the Constitution gives Congress the power
to "punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and
offences against the law of nations."4 2 But the question could be
raised then as to whether, in a Constitution of enumerated powers,
Congress has the power to punish where that authority has not been
explicitly given. "All admit," wrote Marshall, "that the government
may, legitimately, punish any violation of its laws; and yet, this is not
among the enumerated powers of Congress."4 3 The question became
the occasion for Marshall to move back to the deep axioms of moral
judgment and the law. Marshall mused in that vein that the power to
establish must entail the power to preserve. If the Congress can estab-
lish a system of mails, it must have the power to protect the mails
against theft. 44 But then, as Marshall pointed out, the answer must be
implicit in the very idea of the power to legislate. 45 A law was binding
on everyone in the territory who came within its terms. If a law is not
obeyed, and the law not enforced, how was the law "binding"? And if
a law was not binding, if it did not entail an obligation to respect it, in
what sense was it a "law"? As John Stuart Mill would later point out,
we stop using the language of like and dislike and begin using the
39 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525-26 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed.,
1961).
40 Id. at 526.
41 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
42 Id. at 417.
43 Id. at 416.
44 Id. at 417.
45 Id. at 418-19.
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language of "right" and "wrong" to the extent that we think that peo-
ple may rightly be punished for what they are doing.4 6 If we are seri-
ous when we declare a certain class of acts to be "wrong," and to bar
them with the law, the notion of law itself must entail the possibility
that people may be punished for doing the things that the law forbids.
I come back to John Marshall again for my third example, this
one far more elegant and reaching more deeply. In the classic case of
Fletcher v. Peck 7 in 1810, Marshall and his Court struck down a law in
Georgia that rescinded an earlier grant of lands, which had been
tainted by corruption, with members of the legislature bribed to make
the grant. But the problem was that parcels of the land had been sold
in turn to third parties, who were quite innocent of the original
wrongdoing. To revoke the grant was to deprive the innocent buyers
of their land, without returning the money that was spent in buying it.
To rescind a grant in that way was something Marshall found to be the
equivalent of reneging on a contract after people had already made
commitments, paid their money, and opened themselves to serious
costs if the contract were not honored.4 8 With that move Marshall
could have brought the case here under the coverage of the Contracts
Clause of the Constitution: the law of a State had impaired the obliga-
tion of a contract.49 But instead of doing that, Marshall did some-
thing far more elegant. He showed that the Contracts Clause of the
Constitution could be drawn deductively-drawn, that is, with the force
of a syllogism-from the deeper principle on ex post facto laws: the
laws that make something punishable after the fact for something that
had not been illegal, or condemned in the law, when the act was per-
formed; or a law that increased the penalty after the fact, or made it
easier, after the fact, to convict someone for the same act.5 0 But the
principle on ex post facto laws was recognized all around as one of
those deep principles of law; a principle that would have to be
honored in any regime that presumed to call itself a regime of law.
With that subtle move Marshall could put himself in the position of
saying something quite extraordinary. Georgia, he said, was a great
state, but even if Georgia were a separate, sovereign state on its own,
outside the Union-and outside the coverage then of the Contracts
46 See 1 JoHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE Gov-
ERNMENT 45 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1910).
47 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
48 See id. at 137.
49 See U.S. CONsT. art.1, § 10, ci. 1.
50 See 17etcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138-39.
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Clause-this law would still be wrong.51 For its wrongness was rooted
in a proposition that did not depend for its validity on being men-
tioned in the text of the Constitution.5 2
Marshall, in this early period, was nothing if not a great teacher, a
kind of republican schoolmaster, or teacher of the law. And what
Marshall was teaching in this case was that certain parts of the Consti-
tution had the standing for us of a "fundamental law" because they
were grounded in truths that would have been there, and true in
themselves, even if there were no written Constitution.
IV. THE FOUNDERS AND ORIGINALISM
The lessons taught by Hamilton and Marshall are still there to be
learned. They can be recovered simply by reading again the writings
they left us. And when our students encounter them, they encounter
furnishings of mind strikingly different from the furnishings of mind
they find among lawyers in our own day. That recognition raises,
from another angle, the question of why we read the Founders. Yes,
they may help us in understanding the Constitution these men
crafted, but we cannot be confident that Hamilton, Wilson, and Mar-
shall were "representative types." When we read some of these
passages in Hamilton, done so luminously, with elegance and econ-
omy, we really cannot fancy that most men, even in this remarkable
circle of Founders, could have picked up their quills and struck off the
same passage. I would fasten here, on one telling example, in Hamil-
ton's memorandum to President Washington on the constitutionality
of a National Bank. Hamilton was locked there in an argument with
Thomas Jefferson, who was then Secretary of State, and Jefferson was
arguing for a national government more tightly circumscribed. The
argument would touch upon the meaning of the "necessary and
proper" clause of the Constitution, and Hamilton would anticipate
the argument that John Marshall would later make in McCulloch v.
Maryland. His argument would track almost precisely along the lines
that Marshall would later take-except that he takes a turn, and in
that turn reveals a mind in a notably different register. Jefferson was
arguing that there was no strict need for the federal government to
51 Id. at 136 (noting that the validity of the rescinding Act, passed by the legisla-
ture, "might well be doubted, were Georgia a single sovereign power").
52 This sense of the matter was conveyed even more forcefully by justice Johnson
in his concurring opinion: "I do not hesitate to declare," he wrote, "that a state does
not possess the power of revoking its own grants. But I do it on a general principle,
on the reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws even on the
deity." Id. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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create a corporation for a bank when there were banks in the separate
States.5 3 But there, said Hamilton, the Secretary had revealed "a radi-
cal source of error" in his reasoning; he had offered "an idea which
alone refutes the construction."5 4 The constitutional authority of the
government could not depend, as he said, on the "accidental exis-
tence of certain State banks-institutions which happen to exist today,
and, for aught that concerns the government of the United States,
may disappear tomorrow."5 5 He pointed out that " [t] he expediency of
exercising a particular power, at a particular time, must indeed
depend on circumstances, but the constitutional right of exercising it
must be uniform and invariable-the same to day as to morrow. "56
Let us say that we brought forth rules for a national government
tightly circumscribed, so that whether the national government has
the authority, say, to establish a bank, would be contingent on
whether the States already had established such banks for the manage-
ment of public finances. If the institutions were available then within
the States, it would not be "necessary" for national government to
establish such a corporation, and therefore, in Jefferson's construal,
the move would not be constitutional for the national government.5 7
And so Hamilton's argument may be condensed in this way: in Jeffer-
son's construction, whether the federal government may undertake
the activity would be contingent on whether one of the States is already
supplying that function. But that rule itself cannot be contingent. The
rule that the powers are contingent cannot itself be contingent. It
must be, as Hamilton said, "uniform and invariable, the same to day as
to morrow."58
We may ask people to sift out of these accounts the parts that are
contingent or fixed: a father tells his son that, while studying in New
York, he would prefer that he takes cabs or public transportation
rather than buy a car, but he has permission to buy a car if he needs
one. What is contingent is the use of cabs, buses, and subways. What
remains the same is the authority or permission to buy the car. Henry
Hyde came to a small dinner in the first week of the Clinton Adminis-
tration, reporting on a conversation with Al Gore at the White House.
53 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing
a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 245, 247 (Philip
B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
54 Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank (Feb. 23,
1791), in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 247, 249.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Jefferson, supra note 53, at 247.
58 Hamilton, supra note 54, at 249.
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Gore said, "Henry, let us work together to make abortions less neces-
sary."59 Hyde grasped at once the implication that had evaded Al
Gore, or that Al Gore had pretended not to see: what was contingent
was whether abortions would be ordered. What would be fixed, inva-
riable, unchanging-and not open to challenge-was the right to
order an abortion for any reason.
To grasp what Hamilton grasped in that brush with Jefferson is
not to be mired in a dispute long past. It is to cultivate a certain acu-
ity, something bound up with logic, quite fundamental, and yet some-
thing often unnoticed even by people as accomplished as Thomas
Jefferson. To cultivate lawyers and judges who could see at once what
Hamilton saw at once, is part of the mission of this project on the
natural law. It is part of that savviness or worldliness that should
attend the work of those who make or shape the laws. And yet we
ought to be utterly clear that, as we study again the things that Hamil-
ton and the Founders knew, we are far from any claim that all of these
things reflected the "original understanding" of the Founders. When
we see, in the case of the Bank, what Hamilton saw and Jefferson did
not, it becomes plain that we cannot readily impute all of these under-
standings to everyone in that rare class of the Founders. When we
read Hamilton here and in other places, we simply consult him as
someone who could give us the most luminous and clearest account of
the reasoning behind any of these strands or practices in the Constitu-
tion. That does not mean he is not open to question, for there were
indeed a couple of things he got wrong or anticipated wrongly. What
we can say is that he supplies at least the understanding "to beat"-the
understanding we are inclined to favor until we find something else
that rises to the same level of clarity and force. But we should be
clear-and it is worth the pause to underscore the point: we read
Hamilton, Wilson, Marshall, and others, not because they are entirely
representative of the class of the Founders. We do not hold them
forth then under the banner of "originalism." To our friends doing
"originalism" I would suggest that it is nothing less, finally, than this:
that this kind of reasoning simply strikes us as so compelling in touch-
ing the deep canons of reason that it "commands the assent of the
mind."60 These men became our teachers because they did indeed
take us back to the axioms that would have to underlie any regime of
59 See Hadley Arkes, Obama and the Enduring Untruths, CATH. THING (May 25,
2009), http://www.thecatholicthing.org/columns/2009/obama-and-the-enduring-un
truths.html.
60 THE FEDERALIST No. 31, supra note 35, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton).
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law, the axioms that would have to be there even, in fact, if there had
been no written Constitution.6'
V. DIFFERENT ANGLES: JUDGE BoRK AND JUSTICE SCALIA
That theme of judges teaching brings me to two friends, distin-
guished jurists and gifted teachers, and yet men who have been scath-
ing in their aversion to natural law, Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge
Robert Bork. As I have argued in the past, these jurists have given us
some compelling moments in applying the canons of reason to the
cases coming before them. They have given us some elegant exam-
ples of how natural law might be done even while they have been pro-
fessing up and down that it cannot be done. I have argued to the
Justice that he has done the work of natural law handsomely in cases
like Rapanos v. United States,'62 which dealt with the limits on the
expansive reach of the Army Corps of Engineers in trying to claim
jurisdiction over wetlands, including anything essentially wet.63 Scalia
pointed out that the statutes here never meant to cover "transitory
puddles or ephemeral flows of water."64 But then in response to Jus-
tice Kennedy he delivered this telling, Talmudic question: "[W]hat
possible linguistic usage would accept that whatever . . . affects waters
of the United States is waters of the United States?" 65 It was an appeal
to propositional logic, something not spelled out in the text of the
Constitution, but something of evident relevance in helping to estab-
lish the limits to the reach of a federal statute.
Some of our friends do not seem to notice that they are doing
natural law, just as they are speaking prose. And so they flex their
genius at critical times for the purpose of avoiding natural law and
keeping out of the hands of their adversaries the appeal to natural law
or moral reasoning. In the Heley66 case from the District of Columbia
three years ago, the Supreme Court held that the right in the Second
Amendment to keep and bear arms was indeed a right that was con-
firmed for persons, for individuals, not merely for militias organized
by the States.67 In the course of his opinion for the majority, Justice
Scalia appealed to a deep right of self-preservation. 68 In a conversa-
tion a while back I remarked that I assumed that he was appealing to
61 See, e.g., id. at 193-94.
62 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
63 See id. at 722.
64 Id. at 733.
65 Id. at 755.
66 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
67 See id. at 585, 592.
68 See id. at 584-86.
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the right of an innocent person to fend off an unjustified assault. And
he confirmed that that was indeed what he had in mind. But those
words on self-preservation were not in the text of the Second Amend-
ment, and so the question arose: Was he appealing to a deep principle
that did not depend for its validity on its mention in the text? Or, was
he saying that Blackstone and James Wilson invoked that right of self-
preservation, and that many people read them at the time?
I do not think that the Justice has settled his answer to that ques-
tion, but he seems to be tilted to the second-to the evidence in the
record that this understanding was so widespread at the Founding
that it could plausibly be counted as part of the "original understand-
ing." The hazard here is precisely that this approach converts juris-
prudence into legislative history. In the case of the Second
Amendment, it redirects us to ask: How many of the men who framed
the Second Amendment and voted to ratify it in the States had actu-
ally incorporated that understanding expressed by Blackstone, Locke,
Hobbes, and others? Well, how many would be enough before we
could impute the understanding to the Founders and stamp it author-
itatively as part of the "original understanding"? In the nature of
things, we cannot get an answer to that question. But even if we did, it
would not be the answer to the question we are asking; it would not be
the answer to the question of whether the laws may cast up barriers to
an innocent person, trying to make use of lethal force in defending
himself against an unjustified assault if that seems to be the only way
of defending himself.
More recently, Robert Bork offered a criticism of President
Obama for backing away from a defense of the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA).69 Bork was certain, as I am, that the judgment reached
by Mr. Obama, on the constitutionality of DOMA, was quite wrong.70
The President had come to the judgment that it was as wrong to with-
hold a marriage license from a couple of the same sex as it had been
wrong, in an earlier day, to withhold a marriage license from a couple
composed of members of different races.71 Mr. Obama professed to
think that the willingness to treat these couples differently from other
couples allowed to marry violated the Equal Protection Clause.72
In that judgment, I agree emphatically with Robert Bork; I share
with him the view that the President's argument is quite untenable.
But we reach that judgment through paths notably different. Judge
69 Robert H. Bork, Offense to the Constitution Act, NAT'L REV., Mar. 21, 2011, at 16.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
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Bork would simply ask whether the right articulated in this case was
contained in the Constitution, or whether it was originally under-
stood, by the men who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amend-
ment7 3 : Had it really been understood at the time that that
Amendment would make it indefensible to confine marriage to one
man and one woman? Could we plausibly impute then to the authors
of that Amendment a willingness to install same-sex marriage? The
notion, of course, is quite bizarre. I would have to doubt that any
such idea was in the head of anyone who had anything to do with the
writing or passage of that Amendment. And yet, if we were to be gov-
erned on this matter by the "original understanding," the record here
carries a serious embarrassment for the arguments of the "original-
ists." Robert Bork harbors no real doubt that it would be contrary to
the principles of the Constitution to bar people, through the laws,
from marrying across racial lines. But if there is anything that is clear
about the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
that Lyman Trumbull, who managed that Amendment in the Senate,
assured his colleagues up and down that nothing in that proposed
Amendment would call into question those laws in Illinois as well as
Virginia that barred interracial marriage.74 These were the laws on
miscegenation. And it seemed to be one of those things firmly under-
stood that the Fourteenth Amendment had no ghost of a chance to be
enacted unless Trumbull could credibly offer those assurances to his
colleagues and the public.
It is a nice question then for our friends committed to "original-
ism" as to whether the Court should have decided Loving v. Virginia7 5
in 1967 and struck down those laws barring marriage across racial
lines.76 I seriously doubt thatJustices Scalia or Thomas, strongly com-
mitted to versions of "originalism," would argue now against deciding
that case the way it came out. But the recognition, surely melancholy
for Justice Scalia, is that the Court could reach that decision only by
going outside the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and explaining
the principle that makes it deeply wrong for a legislature to conclude
73 See id.
74 See, in this vein, the exchange among Senators Trumbull, Fessenden, and
Johnson, during the debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, in CONG. GLoBE, 39TH
CoNG., 1ST SEsS. 505-06 (1866); and the exchange between Trumbull and Sen. Davis,
in id. at 600. This understanding was also incorporated in some early cases, testing
the laws on miscegenation under the Fourteenth Amendment. See In re Hobbs, 12 F.
Cas. 262 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (Ind. 1871); State v. Hair-
ston, 63 N.C. 451 (N.C. 1869); Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287 (Tenn. 1871).
75 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
76 Id. at 12.
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that the fitness of people to enter marriage could hinge in any way on
their race. The question would bring us back to the wrong in princi-
ple of racial discrimination anchored in the premises of "determin-
ism": we cannot coherently reach judgments about the worth and
deserts of people on the basis of their race, as though race exerted
some deterministic control over the conduct of people-as though, if
we knew the race of any person, we would know anything of moral
significance about him, as in whether he was a good or bad man, who
deserved to be welcomed or shunned, praised or blamed." Do we
really have any ground, then, on the basis of race, for making guesses
about the fitness of anyone to accept the obligations of marriage?
But of course the Supreme Court had never actually articulated
that principle on racial discrimination. In the legendary case of Brown
v. Board of Education,78 the Court let the wrong of the case hinge on
the prospect of injuries done to youngsters in segregated schools,
though it never offered any evidence at all on any injuries actually
suffered by black children in those schools in Topeka and other cities
in the South.79 Nor had the Court even shown that the black children
in those schools suffered any drop in their motivation and self-esteem.
But of course, if the Court had ever taken the trouble to get clear on
that principle, it could have come to the clear recognition that
schemes of racial preference, assigning benefits and disabilities solely,
decisively, on the ground of race, were schemes that shared the same
wrong in principle as racial segregation or racial discrimination.
But as I have argued in the past, it is no knock on Lyman Trum-
bull that he had not seen all of the implications that could spring
from the principles he was planting in the law.80 For who among us
can? The life of moral experience is a life of discovering, in cases that
suddenly illuminate the landscape, implications of our own principles
that have heretofore gone unseen. But it would have been necessary
to explain the principle here in order to explain why it was legitimate
for the Court to depart from the original understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment and hold invalid that law in Virginia barring mar-
riage between blacks and whites. And yet, that is precisely what our
colleagues holding up the banner of "originalism" have been so averse
to doing. For to move along that line is to move along a path that
77 For the fuller account of this argument, rooted in the logic of law itself and the
matter of "racial determinism," see ARKEs, supra note 24, at 52-55; ARKES, supra note
28, at 88, 92-93, 97-99.
78 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
79 Id. at 493-95. On the empirical evidence engaged in the Brown case, see HAD-
LEY ARKEs, THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE CITY 232-36, 240 (1981).
80 See ARKEs, supra note 24, at 23.
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takes us outside the text-takes us to principles that need to underlie
the text in order to make the text comprehensible and compelling in
the cases coming before us. Some votaries of conservative jurispru-
dence have been so offended by the performance of activist judges,
that they would rather take the path of doing legislative history, or
getting tangled in arguments over the reading of the historical record,
if that will have at least the effect of diverting people from getting
lured into the mirage of natural law.
But to borrow a line from Stanton Evans, the problem with this
style of pragmatism is that it doesn't work.81 We know exactly what
will happen if the cases on same-sex marriage are argued mainly or
decisively on the ground of the "original understanding" of the Four-
teenth Amendment. We will have a replay of Brown v. Board, where
the Court invited analyses of the historical record and found that they
yielded no clear conclusion. We will find judges disagreeing about
the historical record. They will hear from historians trying to show
several of the politicians receding from a bigoted rejection of the
homosexual life, and the conclusion will emerge that there is disa-
greement among the experts that the Fourteenth Amendment had to
imply a rejection of homosexuality. Justice Scalia's most familiar line,
in recoiling from natural law, is that it entails no agreement, that it is
open to endless disagreement. One would think that the same objec-
tion should be quite sufficient and decisive in detaching our friends
from their insistence on finding the answers in these cases by reading
the historical record in search of rights rooted in our "traditions."
VI. IN CoNrRAST: THE CATEGORICAL FORCE OF FIRST PRINCIPLES
In striking contrast, we encounter no disagreement on those
canons of reason that truly are taken as axioms in our law. I have
already mentioned that first principle, expressed in different ways by
James Wilson and Immanuel Kant, that we cast judgments only in the
domain of freedom, where people choose their own acts, that we do
not hold people responsible for acts they were powerless to affect.82
But consider also the logical string that begins with that anchoring
moral point that we insist on punishing people only for wrongdoing.
Any system ofjustice must begin by respecting the difference between
innocence and guilt. We insist then on making that discrimination in
the most demanding way before we visit punishment on people. We
insist on testing evidence by the canons of reason, rather than having
81 See Stanton Evans, The Foundations of Conservatism, COUNCIL FOR NAT'L POL'Y,
http://www.cfnp.org/page.aspx?pid=280 (last visited Nov. 24, 2011).
82 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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defendants run over hot coals or outrun a mob in the street. With the
same logic, we think that any defendant must have the right to see the
evidence and witnesses arrayed against him so that he has the chance
to rebut them. For we have a better chance then of producing a ver-
dict that is substantively just, a verdict that makes an accurate discrimi-
nation between innocence and guilt and deals out punishment only to
the guilty.
What I have just run through is a logical skein, and along the way
I have folded in understandings that have become quite familiar
under the Constitution. We have seen judges coming out with ringing
conclusions of that kind as though they were just discovering grand
truths. And yet, these are simply the axioms that have ever been
embedded in the logic of the rule of law. In fact, they are so woven
into our understanding that we are hardly even aware of them any
longer, and we could hardly conceive of our law without them. But
what is not widely recognized is that we have come to understand
these features of the law as bearing a categoical truth, which comes out
to us in this way: we know that, even in the best places, juries will make
mistakes, evidence will be misconstrued, and even with the fairest pro-
cedures some innocent people will be punished and the guilty go free.
And yet nothing in that experience could dislodge us from the convic-
tion that, before we send a man to jail for a serious crime, he should
be given the chance to address and refute the evidence and witnesses
against him. Those principles will ever be in place in anything that
calls itself a system of justice. They will not be dislodged by anything
in the spotty record of our species in administering justice.
And so contrary to claims made by some of our friends, highly
placed and highly experienced in the law, the axioms of natural law
inspire far less division and controversy than the theories of "original-
ism" or the method of legislative history offered by conservatives as
well as liberals. I think we can predict, in the litigation over same-sex
marriage, that the courts facing the challenges to traditional marriage
will hear the arguments over "original understanding" and quickly
brush them aside. The historical record, they will briskly tell us, is not
free of controversy. And so where will the argument move? It will
move precisely to the point that Robert Bork found indefensible,
though he did not linger with the explanation of why it was indefen-
sible: we will be challenged to explain why race is irrelevant to the
sexual relation that was central to the joining of bodies, as well as
souls, in marriage. At the same time, we would have the task of argu-
ing, in contrast, that the complementarity of the sexes is essential to
the purpose, or telos, implicit in the very existence of men and women:
that marriage finds its distinct, and most coherent, rationale as a
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framework of commitment around that central purpose of sexuality,
in the begetting of children. One way or another the argument will
have to make its way to that point, and everyone knows it. The argu-
ment will not hinge at any point on the speeches of Lyman Trumbull
and the "original understanding" of the Fourteenth Amendment.83
But if that is the case, we earnestly press the question: What is the
purpose or rationale of a mode of jurisprudence that is guaranteed to
distract us from the main question in substance, a mode of argument
that is bound to be a sure loser in the future as it has been for most of
the past fifty years? Is there any purpose behind this ritual of evasion
other than the concern that we divert judges and lawyers from the
dangers of taking natural law seriously?
VII. JUDGE O'SCANNLAIN'S RESERVATIONs-AND THEIR REVELATION
Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain, one of the true stars of the federal
bench, delivered a lecture several months ago at Fordham,84 and the
mark of his rarity as a conservative judge, is that he actually made an
earnest appeal to consider seriously the claims of natural law.85 He
cited Justice Scalia's opinion in the Heller case on the Second Amend-
ment as a notable example of the way that natural law may be engaged
in deciding cases of real consequence.86 But he took Scalia's
approach to provide the touch that rescued natural law from the
claims of a hovering omnipresence, floating beyond the Constitution,
in a hazy world above the clouds. As I understand Judge
O'Scannlain's argument, Scalia's dip into history shows that some of
these principles of the natural law were explicitly acknowledged and
respected at the time of the founding, when these constitutional pro-
visions were drafted. O'Scannlain followed the Court in holding that
the core of the Second Amendment was a right to self-defense, that
this was a "pre-existing right" that the Second Amendment "codi-
fied."8 7 What seems critical for O'Scannlain are the signs that the
Framers had intended to recognize that natural right, that "pre-
existing right," in the text of the Constitution. As O'Scannlain put it,
"where a constitutional provision codified a pre-existing, natural right,
the historical understanding of that natural right can clarify ambigui-
83 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
84 Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79 FORD-
"AM L. REv. 1513 (2011).
85 Id. at 1515.
86 Id. at 1523 ("Helleris at least as notable for its method of constitutional interpre-
tation, as it is for its actual holding.").
87 Id. at 1524 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008)).
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ties in the constitutional text and elucidate the rationale and scope of
the constitutional right."8 8 It is that connection, then, between the
principles of natural law and the things distinctly of the American
Constitution, that establishes a kind of permission or license to make
the appeal now, in our own day, to those principles of the natural law.
At the risk of a pause in the movement of the argument, I should
not avoid the point that, for the most important figures at the Found-
ing, it is arguable that the "original understanding" was closer to the
reverse of O'Scannlain's view: in that classic early case of Chisholm v.
Georgia9 in 1793,James Wilson noted that we were at the beginning of
the American law, with no precedents accumulated under the Consti-
tution. And so before he would cite any American case, he would
appeal to Thomas Reid and his remarkable work in illuminating "the
original faculties of the mind."90 Wilson would take the matter back,
in other words, to the grounds on which we can claim to know any-
thing, and know that we know-know that certain things, even in the
domain of moral judgment, could not be otherwise. Without exactly
putting the label on it, he was showing the awareness of the deep prin-
ciples that have to be in place before we can have a system of law. In
other words, that the American Constitution began with the natural law.
It did not require then any special permission to invoke it, since it was
there all the time, and would be there all the time, as the ground of
what we were doing when we were "doing law."
Judge O'Scannlain's argument seems to depend on the interven-
tion of what could be called, following Hamilton, a "rule of construc-
tion" or perhaps a "constitutive rule," a rule that can show that a
principle of natural law has been absorbed into the law of the Consti-
tution.91 Scalia's opinion in Heller has, for O'Scannlain, a ring of apt-
ness because its appeal to natural law was connected with something
in our history of serious reflection on matters legal92 (a history that
included, say, the widespread reading of Blackstone) .9 The constitu-
tive rule looks to see if there was a deliberate attempt to codify a natu-
ral right in the Constitution. That situation was apparently to be
distinguished from cases in which judges would be floating free,
detached from anything in our history, or even offering a filtered and
88 Id. at 1525.
89 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
90 Id. at 453-54.
91 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 39, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton).
92 See O'Scannlain, supra note 84, at 1523.
93 HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE CREATION OF AMERICAN COMMON LAW, 1850-1880, at
17 (2004).
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quite fanciful view of the relevant history.9 4 just what the features are
that mark these differences between Scalia in Heller and these other
judges doing pseudo-history, are things that could be worked out. But
once we have that "constitutive rule" framed as precisely as we can
frame it to avoid abuse, that "constitutive rule," to authorize an appeal
to the natural law, becomes, in effect, part of the apparatus of judicial
interpretation.
Is it not worth pointing out then that this rule of construction,
which O'Scannlain regards now as quite critical to the place of natural
law in constitutional interpretation, is nowhere to be found in the Consti-
tution? It is not part of the positive law. How then are we supposed to
know it, and why are we justified in taking that proposition, or that
"constitutive rule," as authoritative and governing? Would it be like
Hamilton's rules of construction: that it was not contained in the posi-
tive law; that it was known to us, rather, through the "nature and rea-
son of the thing"? Could the same thing be said now about a
constitutive rule that would explain to us the contingencies under
which natural law may be invoked or foreclosed? It is not part of the
positive law; it simply offers a proposition thought to be sensible in
itself, something containing, as Hamilton said, "an internal evidence,
which antecedent to all reflection or combination commands the
assent of the mind."95 In other words, it is closer to a first principle; it
is simply a rule sprung from the natural law.
Once again, we have been speaking prose all our lives; we have
never left the natural law.
VIII. WHAT DIFFERENCE WOULD IT MAKE?
The question has been put earnestly to us, though, by one friend
who had clerked for the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Would
you really come out, at the end, with conclusions different from those
that Scalia and the conservative judges would reach? And if not, what
is the point?
As it turns out, Justice Scalia has indeed spoken for me in these
cases most of the time, and spoken for me grandly. In his critical
94 1 think here, notably, ofjustice Black in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967),
removing passages from quotes as he sought to prove that Congress had never sought
to strip people of their citizenship without their consent. See id. at 257, 260-61, 263,
264-67. It is rare that an opinion of the Court is, as the saying goes, "blown out of the
water" by a dissenting opinion; butJustice Harlan, in dissent, so refuted and discred-
ited Black's account of the historical record that one wonders just why five members
of the Court were content to leave that opinion on the books as an opinion that spoke
for them. See id. at 268-93 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
95 THE FEDERALIST No. 31, supra note 35, at 193-94 (Alexander Hamilton).
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views on abortion in cases like Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,9 6
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,97 and Stenberg
v. Carhart;"9 or even in cases touching on abortion, such as Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, Inc.99 and Hill v. Colorado;00 in his dissents on
cases dealing with sexuality and the law in Romer v. Evans'0 and Law-
rence v. Texas;102 or in his commentaries on assisted suicide in Gonzales
v. Oregon'0 3-in all of these instances, to my mind, he touched the
right themes in the right way. And he touched something running
deep when he remarked in a case in 1996 that, "[d]ay by day, case by
case, [the Court] is busy designing a Constitution for a country I do
not recognize."10 4 In Lee v. Weisman, 05 it took his acute sense of
things to bring home to us that the Court had articulated a right so
refined, in resisting an invocation at a high school commencement,
that it brought a right that virtually extinguished itself.106 In Hill v.
Colorado07 and Madsen v. Women's Health Center,108 he showed how leg-
islators and judges, in ways subtle and unsubtle, managed to withdraw
from pro-life demonstrators those rights of speech they routinely con-
firm for everyone else, including Nazis.
Happily, we would find ourselves agreeing with our friends on the
Court most of the time. They are aimed rightly, and I am tempted to
say that, like the rest of us, their sense of justice may run at times
beyond the theory that acts as their vehicle in getting them there. But
it cannot escape notice that even our friends on the Court fall into
disagreements, some rather heated. My own friend, Antonin Scalia,
has not been exactly diffident about telling me when his judgment on
any matter veers from my own. He is of course disappointed, but
hardly surprised, when his friends occasionally take a path notably dif-
96 492 U.S. 490, 532-37 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
97 505 U.S. 833, 979-1002 (1992) (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
98 530 U.S. 914, 953-56 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99 512 U.S. 753, 784-815 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
100 530 U.S. 703, 741-65 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
102 539 U.S. 558, 586-605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103 546 U.S. 243, 275-99 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104 Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
105 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
106 Id. at 631-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107 530 U.S. at 741-65 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
108 512 U.S. at 784-815 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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ferent from the one he is deadly sure is the most defensible. Differ-
ences are sure, though, to arise. But the claim we are making is that
the natural law, or the laws of reason, provide a much firmer ground
of principle for our judgments, and if we are right in that claim, we
may avoid many of the distractions that judges and lawyers are bound
to encounter as they follow a design to avoid any distinct moral logic
or moral ground for their judgments. And in turning away from that
path of avoidance, our claim would have to be that we could offer, in
some places, a more coherent account of the law we would preserve
and shape, where it falls to us to shape it, under the Constitution.
In that vein, we could never have signed on as the Court, in 1971,
recast the jurisprudence on speech and civility by incorporating the
relativism of Justice Harlan: "[O]ne man's vulgarity is another's
lyric."109 We could not have followed our conservative judges as they
began to sign on, year by the year, to the notion that ordinary people
and legislators could make no plausible restrictions based on the "con-
tent" of speech. We could not then have joined a Court that cast the
protections of the Constitution on the burning of crosses"o or the
burning of the American flag.I 1 Nor would we join in draping the
protections of the First Amendment on a band harassing a family at
the funeral of a dead marine with signs saying, "Semper Fi Fags," and
"Thank God for Dead Soldiers."' 12
But this is not a matter that affects only the most dramatic cases,
like the burning of crosses. This shift in jurisprudence has affected
life as lived in this country every day, for it has altered profoundly the
conventions of civility that affect us in the most ordinary pursuits,
whether in traveling to work or walking abroad in the city. For years
the urbanists have spun out grand theories for the vibrancy of the city,
as people encounter those they do not know in public places." 3 The
urbanists enjoin us to leave our private automobiles in favor of public
transport, and they urge planners to create public spaces to draw peo-
ple out of their enclaves." 4 ,But those encounters were more engag-
ing in the past and freighted with far less danger. For it used to be
109 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
110 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
111 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). The dissent in this case was joined by
Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor.
112 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216-17 (2011).
113 See, e.g., PHILLIP BESS, TILL WE HAVE BUILT JERUSALEM (2006).
114 See, e.g., Phillip Bess, A Realist Philosophical Case for Urbanism and Against Sprawl:
Part One, PUB. DISCOURSE (July 11, 2011), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011 /
07/3379 (expounding on arguments for urban planning including walkable distances
and public commons).
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assumed that people had an obligation to restrain themselves in their
expression and their acting out when they ventured into public-that
they bore an obligation to refrain from gross, assaulting speech or
obscene, shocking acts, out of a respect for the sensibilities of others
in a public place. But with the shift in the Cohen case in 1971, con-
firmed now over many years, the presumptions have been shifted. We
begin now with the presumptive freedom of people to express them-
selves in any manner, no matter how shocking or assaulting, and the
burden falls to all other people to avert their eyes-or simply avoid
public places altogether. Restaurants have gone out of business on
Connecticut Avenue in Washington because customers have not
found the evening enhanced by walking through a battery of hawkers,
importuning or insulting them.' 1 5 But in the curious jurisprudence
wrought by the courts, as Justice Scalia has not let us forget, these
presumptions have been notably reversed for one class of speakers:
pro-life demonstrators, standing outside of clinics, may not even
approach people with a request to talk, let alone hold up signs of
reproach and condemnation." 6 And the people entering these clin-
ics need not take on the responsibility, assigned to everyone else, of
averting their eyes, toughening their skin, and even avoiding this ven-
ture into public.
But the differences in jural perspective that I am marking off
here may have their most profound effect as they reach the most cen-
tral question that the law may ever reach: who counts as a human
person-who counts as the kind of being whose injuries matter? It
was the question raised as President Clinton vetoed the bill on partial
birth abortion and expressed the deepest concern for the health of
the woman denied that procedure.' 17 Of that other being present in
the surgery-the one whose head was being punctured and the con-
tents sucked out" 8-the assault on the health of that being made no
impression on President Clinton. The harms did not register because
the sufferer of the harms did not count in this picture. No more did
they count to that anesthesiologist asked by Judge Casey in New York
whether he had thought of administering an anesthetic to the child,
legs dangling out of the birth canal, about to have its head punc-
115 See HADLEY ARKEs, NATuRAL RIGHTS & THE RicHT TO CHOOSE 55 (2002).
116 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994).
117 See Remarks on Returning Without Approval to the House of Representatives
Partial Birth Abortion Legislation, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 643, 644-45 (Apr. 10,
1996).
118 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 959-60 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(describing in detail partial birth abortion procedures).
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tured.i19 That possibility, the doctor admitted, had simply never
occurred to him.120 The problem disappeared from view as soon as
one absorbed the notion that the being in the womb did not count.
But in raising questions of this kind, a jurisprudence with our
perspective would pose the question insistently: what is the ground of
principle on which the law may remove a whole class of human beings
from the circle of rights-bearing beings who may be subject to the
protections of the law? But then we would press the question further
upon our conservative judges: What was the ground, again, on which.
even the conservatives on the Court have assumed that the Constitu-
tion has nothing to say about the principled grounds on which legisla-
tors may withdraw the protections of the law from those small human
beings in the womb? I have mused in print over the problem of what
the judges would have done if the understanding had settled in quite
early that those Civil War Amendments applied only to blacks who
had become human. For after all, we've been told that not everything
conceived of humans is human at all times and stages in its life. And
so the matter could be returned to the States as the judges declare
that they have no more competence in deciding on the beginning of
human life than the first nine names in a local telephone directory.' 2 '
Does anyone really think the judges in our own day would have no
questions to raise if the States decided that children were more
human as they were lighter in complexion, or scored higher on verbal
tests? But we know that the judges have the modes of argument read-
ily at hand in a case of that kind to identify grounds that were thor-
oughly arbitrary in making discriminations here between the human
and the not-quite-human, between those with a claim to live and those
whose lives may be taken without the need to render a justification.
Why then should we suppose that judges in our own day, liberal or
conservative, would encounter an inscrutable problem if they found
humans in the womb put outside the protections of the law because of
their height or weight, because they are lacking limbs or had not
acquired yet the facility to speak and do syllogisms? Why then, we
119 Nat'1 Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
vacated, 224 Fed. App'x 88 (2d Cir. 2007) (recounting the testimony of the main
anesthesiologist consulted by the defenders of partial-birth abortion, Dr. Kanwaijeet
Anand, a professor of pediatrics, anesthesiology, pharmacology, and neurobiology at
the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences).
120 Referring to Dr. Anand, the anesthesiologist, and others, judge Casey noted
that "[w] hen questioned about whether they spoke to their patients about fetal pain,
Plaintiffs' answers ranged from uncertainty about whether fetuses feel pain to a lack
of caring on the matter." Id. at 466.
121 For this thought experiment, see ARKEs, supra note 115, at 208-11 (2002).
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must ask, are the men we regard with the highest respect as jurists so
utterly convinced that something in the scheme of jurisprudence and
the Constitution somehow bars them from raising that kind of ques-
tion, the question that pierces to the core of those rights, and those
persons, that the Constitution was designed to protect?
We raise then an appeal to our friends doing conservative juris-
prudence: You were drawn to the life of the law because you thought
it raised questions of the gravest consequence, questions of moral con-
sequence, about the just ordering of our lives, about the things that
are just or unjust, right or wrong. You thought it was worth the effort
of extended study, of immersing yourself in the study and way of life
of lawyers. And having come this far, why would you ask us or your-
selves to settle in with a mode of reasoning about the law that gives us
a kind of sing-song morality, a set of the slogans pretending to be a
jural philosophy, and whose main rationale is to avoid the appearance
of engaging in moral reasoning. You think that the effort to address
the moral questions at the heart of the law too ambitious, too risky,
too difficult to do well, and likely to license mischief. You seek safety
in contriving formulas of the positive law without looking into the
deep principles that underlie the positive law. You offer constructions
to scale down the project, to look only at the text of the Constitution,
or the tradition of holdings byjudges, while cautioning us again not to
ask the questions that run beneath the surface to the core of things.
At best, we may produce in that way decisions that seem by and large
to come out the right way. But we cannot give our best reasons, our
fullest reasons, the reasons that give the most coherent account of the
decisions we are making, the law we are shaping. And the question at
the end is, why should you-why should we-settle for anything so
diminished, when measured against the moral seriousness of the ques-
tions brought before us?
In the Physics, Aristotle remarked that if the art were in the mater-
ials, we would expect to see ships growing out of trees. 2 2 But ships
were part of a world governed by design, by the awareness of ends,
and the shaping of reasons. The world of law is part of that same
world. And so we offer this appeal from the old jurisprudence to our
friends who are offering us their version of conservative jurispru-
dence: Where in all of this is the art? Where is the understanding you
have cultivated, the judgment you have seasoned in experience?
Where in all of this would we find the record, to be lingering in time,
122 ARISTOTLE, PHYsics bk. II, at 199 (350 B.C.E.), reprinted in THE COMPLETE
WoRus OF ARISTOTLE 340 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1987) ("If the ship-building art were
in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature.").
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that we were here. that the law we are preserving would be as compre-
hensible and compelling, as resonant with common sense, in the next
generation as it is in our own, and as it will ever be?
This we may take as our Natural Law Manifesto; this is the chal-
lenge we would pose now to our friends in the law. But it is a chal-
lenge to join us in a conversation. Some of our friends find
something attractive about the very idea of natural law, but they doubt
that it is practicable and they are wary of it. To them we say,join us: If
we are wrong, you can help show us where we're wrong. And if we are
right, we simply discover anew the grounds of law we share more
deeply, the grounds of law that have ever been in place.
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